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sion by expanding the underlying arti￿cial samples. In contrast, in the data the e⁄ects
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based on empirically relevant sample sizes, a benchmark international real business
cycle model predicts insigni￿cant e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration for all business cycle
statistics except the correlation of consumption. A sensitivity analysis shows that
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1. Introduction
Does ￿nancial globalization have signi￿cant e⁄ects on the business cycle? A growing
body of empirical literature suggests that the answer is no. Studies in this literature use
regression models to investigate whether the volatility and co-movement of key macro-
economic variables are signi￿cantly a⁄ected by ￿nancial globalization. Most papers
￿nd insigni￿cant or non-robust e⁄ects. Examples of this are Kose, Prasad and Terrones
(2003a,b) who use a number of ￿nancial integration measures and several business cycle
statistics. They ￿nd that a particular indicator of integration has a signi￿cant e⁄ect
on the ratio of consumption to income volatility, whereas the e⁄ect from an alternative
indicator is insigni￿cant. In contrast, the alternative indicator signi￿cantly a⁄ects the
correlation of GDP while the e⁄ect from the ￿rst indicator is insigni￿cant. A large
number of additional business cycle statistics￿ the standard deviations of total and
private consumption, income and GDP and the cross correlation of consumption￿ are
insigni￿cantly a⁄ected by either of the two indicators of integration.
1 In this paper, I
ask whether we should be surprised to obtain such insigni￿cant e⁄ects.
Whether we are surprised or not depends on our prior expectation before seeing
the results. In the extent to which this expectation is based on international business
cycle models, the ￿ndings might seem surprising. According to these models, ￿nancial
integration a⁄ects the business cycle because it increases risk sharing and eases the ￿ ow
of investments across borders (see e.g. Baxter and Crucini, 1995 and Heathcote and
Perri, 2002). Given the theoretical prediction, it is straightforward to conjecture that
￿nancial integration has signi￿cant e⁄ects on business cycles. In this paper, I show that
this conjecture is wrong. The reason is that comparing the model predictions with the
empirical evidence in this way misses one crucial element: di⁄erences in the underlying
sample sizes. Theoretical predictions are based on model generated data implying that
sample sizes can, in principle, be any size. Hence, the e⁄ect of changing the ￿nancial
market structure can be determined to any level of precision. In contrast, the datasets
underlying the empirical results are often quite small implying imprecision in estimated
e⁄ects and insigni￿cance. Without accounting explicitly for the di⁄erences in sample
sizes, the precision with which we can determine the e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration is not
determined by the theoretical models. This means that if the theoretical conclusions
are based on the shorter samples available to the empirical researcher, it might be the
case that standard models also predict insigni￿cant e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration. The
main contribution of the paper is to show that this intuition is correct for a range
of conventional models and business cycle statistics. Hence, the main message of the
paper is that, according to standard models, we should not expect ￿nancial integration
to have signi￿cant e⁄ects on business cycles with the current sample sizes.
1Similar results hold across a number of papers. In section 2, I provide a short review of this
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This message is important since the expectation in the empirical literature seems
to be that ￿nancial integration should signi￿cantly a⁄ect the cycle.
2 This expectation
is, in many cases, based on the same theoretical models that I use and is, as I show,
correct if samples are su¢ ciently long. However, when sample sizes resemble those
used empirically the e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration are likely to be insigni￿cant. Hence,
the very models that lead us to believe that ￿nancial integration a⁄ects the cycle, also
predict that these e⁄ects are insigni￿cant with the current sample sizes. Therefore when
the e⁄ects then turn out to be insigni￿cant in the data, we should not be surprised.
3
I develop this result within a benchmark International Real Business Cycle (IRBC)
model but also consider a new Keynesian model structure. These models are set up
such that ￿nancial integration will a⁄ect the business cycle. The question is whether the
e⁄ect is signi￿cant when it is estimated on empirically relevant sample sizes. To answer
this question, I use a Monte Carlo procedure that involves simulating arti￿cial data
from the models and running regressions on the arti￿cial data. The empirical part of
the procedure closely matches that of Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003a,b). In essence,
they regress a number of di⁄erent business cycle statistics on measures of ￿nancial inte-
gration and some control variables. I do the same with the di⁄erence being, of course,
that my business cycle statistics are based on arti￿cial data. As mentioned, I primarily
use di⁄erent variants of an IRBC model with productivity shocks as my data generating
mechanisms. The IRBC model remains the workhorse of international business cycle
analysis and is therefore a natural starting point.
4 The model allows for di⁄erent inter-
national ￿nancial market structures and I assume that ￿nancial integration corresponds
to a move from one structure to another. For instance, in the benchmark model ￿nan-
cial integration is a change from a single bond economy to complete ￿nancial markets.
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To determine the short sample prediction of a particular model, I run a large number
of regressions and calculate the fraction of regressions where the e⁄ect of integration is
signi￿cant. This fraction is the metric I use to compare the theoretical predictions with
the empirical evidence.
The paper combines elements from both the theoretical and empirical literatures on
the business cycle e⁄ect of ￿nancial globalization. The approach in the theoretical lit-
erature is to set up a model framework that allows for various international ￿nancial
2For instance, Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003b, p. 62) write: "One striking result is that, on
average, consumption correlations have not increased in the 1990￿ s, precisely when ￿nancial integration
would have been expected to result in better risk-sharing opportunities".
3It can, obviously, be argued that the theoretical models are misspeci￿ed so any result based on
these models are wrong. This paper does not try to determine whether models are misspeci￿ed or not.
Instead, I note that any prior belief about the e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration on business cycles must
be derived from a business cycle model. Since the models I use are standard, they (or a close relative)
underlie the expectation of signi￿cance in the ￿rst place. Hence, arguing that they are misspeci￿ed is
the same as saying that the initial expectation of signi￿cance is wrong.
4In a sensitivity check I consider a new Keynesian model with price and wage stickiness a⁄ected by
both productivity and money supply shocks.
5In the sensitivity analysis, I consider ￿nancial autarky vs. a single bond economy.4 JENS IVERSEN
market structures and analyze how changing these a⁄ects business cycles (see e.g. Bax-
ter and Crucini, 1995, Heathcote and Perri, 2002 or Sutherland, 1996). The conclusions
from this literature are based on long samples generated by the model implying that
the e⁄ects of integration can be determined to any level of precision. The empirical
literature, in contrast, uses linear regression models to investigate whether ￿nancial
globalization has any e⁄ects on business cycles in the data.
6 My analysis borrows from
the theoretical literature in the use of macroeconomic models but di⁄ers since I focus on
the short sample predictions from these models. The way I determine these predictions
is borrowed from the empirical literature since I estimate linear regression models on ar-
ti￿cial data. My results inform both of these literatures. First, the results highlight the
fact that the empirical researcher needs to be careful when comparing her results with
the theoretical predictions since the di⁄erences in the underlying sample sizes might be
able to explain the lack of signi￿cance. Second, the theoretical researcher should think
about how robustly any possible theoretical e⁄ects are determined in the model. A
theoretical e⁄ect that, according to the model, cannot be detected within a reasonable
time frame, is perhaps not that interesting?
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I review the empirical liter-
ature that motivates my study. In section 3, I discuss the theoretical model and the
Monte Carlo procedure used to determine the probability of obtaining signi￿cant esti-
mates. Section 4 contains my benchmark results, provides some intuition and considers
some alternative parameterizations of the model. Section 5 investigates how the results
change with the sample size and section 6 o⁄ers a few concluding remarks.
2. The Empirical Literature
The econometric strategy used in the empirical literature can be described as follows.
The researcher obtains a dataset of aggregate macroeconomic variables for a range of
countries over time. The variables commonly used are aggregate consumption, GDP
and investment. The dataset also contains indicators of ￿nancial integration and con-
trol variables believed to a⁄ect the dependent variable. Using this data, the researcher
calculates standard deviations or cross country correlations of the macroeconomic ag-
gregates.
7 For each business cycle statistic the following regression model is estimated
(2.1) Mi = ￿1 + ￿2FIi + Xi￿ + "i
where Mi indicates the i0th observation of the statistic, FIi is a vector containing
indicators of ￿nancial integration and Xi is a vector of control variables.8
For instance, Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003a,b) use annual data from 76 countries
over 40 years. They split their sample into four non-overlapping periods of ten years
and regress standard deviations (2003a) and cross country correlations (2003b) on two
indicators of ￿nancial integration. They also control for intensity of trade, relative
6See section 2 for a review of this literature.
7The data is logged and passed through a ￿lter before the statistics are calculated. Usually, either
the ￿rst di⁄erence, bandpass or HP ￿lter is employed.
8Given the panel structure of the dataset, Xi often contains time and/or country ￿xed e⁄ects.FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND BUSINESS CYCLES 5
income, a measure of the terms-of-trade volatility and indices of ￿scal and monetary
policy shocks.
Most empirical papers use either standard deviations or cross country correlations as
the business cycle statistic of interest so I divide my review of the literature along these
dimensions.
2.1. Financial Integration and Volatility. The ￿rst paper to consider the impact
of ￿nancial market integration on macroeconomic volatility is (to my knowledge) Razin
and Rose (1994). They regress the standard deviation of consumption, GDP and in-
vestment on measures of goods and ￿nancial market restrictions using di⁄erent sets
of instrumental variables. They do not ￿nd signi￿cant e⁄ects in any of their primary
speci￿cations and use the fact that they cannot distinguish between common and idio-
syncratic shocks as a possible reason for this insigni￿cance. Mendoza (1994) argues that
the result might be due to the presence of structural breaks in the data. Buch, Doepke
and Pierdzioch (2005) use this argument to explain why their integration indicator has
no signi￿cant e⁄ect on output volatility. By splitting their sample into di⁄erent periods,
they show that the e⁄ects of integration have changed over time.
Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003a) consider the e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration on the
volatility of output, income and consumption (both private and total) and the ratio
of total consumption to income volatility. They use the "ratio measure" to control for
changes in overall volatility. They proxy ￿nancial integration using two distinct indi-
cators, namely a de jure indicator that measures whether the country has restrictions
on capital account transactions and a de facto indicator of gross capital ￿ ows to GDP.
9
They ￿nd that ￿nancial integration, as measured by the de facto indicator, has a sig-
ni￿cant (non-linear) e⁄ect on the ratio measure. The e⁄ect of the de jure measure is
insigni￿cant. Neither the volatilities of GDP, income, private nor total consumption
are signi￿cantly a⁄ected by integration. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006) also
￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect on consumption growth volatility using a particular measure
of integration. The result is, however, not robust: using another measure the e⁄ect is
insigni￿cant.
2.2. Financial Integration and Correlations. I now focus my attention on the
cross country correlations. A prominent study is Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003b).
They divide their sample into two groups, the G7 and the rest. Cross correlations
are calculated between each country in the "rest" group and an aggregate of the G7
countries. They ￿nd that their de jure measure of integration has a signi￿cantly positive
e⁄ect on output correlations but that the de facto measure is insigni￿cantly related to
output comovements. Neither ￿nancial integration measure has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on
consumption correlations.
9The de jure measures of integration used in this literature is in some way or another based on
the IMF￿ s AREAER (Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions) data
(Kose et al., 2006). The de facto measures are for the most part based on the work by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007).6 JENS IVERSEN
Imbs (2004, 2006) conducts a similar exercise within a simultaneous equation frame-
work. He argues that it is important to determine the indirect e⁄ects of ￿nancial
integration on business cycle correlation. These e⁄ects, in his empirical model, work
through the degree of specialization which he makes endogenous to ￿nancial integra-
tion. In Imbs (2004), only the correlation of GDP is considered, whereas both GDP and
consumption correlations are analyzed in Imbs (2006). The broad ￿nding is that for
most speci￿cations, GDP correlations increase signi￿cantly with ￿nancial integration.
Hence, more integrated countries have more synchronized business cycles. This ￿nding
is obtained irrespective of whether a de jure or de facto measure of integration is used.
Consumption correlations also increase signi￿cantly following integration if the de jure
measure is used. This e⁄ect, however, is not robust to the use of the de facto measure
of integration.
In summary, the empirical literature ￿nds many insigni￿cant and non-robust e⁄ects
of ￿nancial integration. Most business cycle statistics are insigni￿cantly related to
integration irrespective of whether a de facto or de jure indicator of integration is used.
When signi￿cant e⁄ects are found these are likely not to be robust. For instance, the
prominant studies of Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003a,b) do ￿nd signi￿cant e⁄ects of
￿nancial integration on both output correlations and the ratio of total consumption to
income volatility. The e⁄ects, however, lack robustness since the indicators that yield
signi￿cance di⁄er across the two studies. In the remainder of this paper I investigate
whether we should be surprised to obtain such insigni￿cant ￿ndings.
3. The Model Economy and Monte Carlo Procedure
The models I use as data generating processes are, for the most part, variants of the
International Real Business Cycle model (see e.g. Heathcote and Perri, 2002). The
main features of the model are the following. The world consists of two countries,
Home and Foreign. There are three sectors in each country; a household, an interme-
diate goods and a ￿nal goods sector. Intermediate goods are produced under constant
returns to scale using labor and capital services. Final goods are country speci￿c and
produced by combining intermediate goods from both countries. Final goods are used
for consumption and investment purposes. In the benchmark model the only sources
of uncertainty are country speci￿c productivity shocks.
It is outside the scope of this paper to give a fully ￿ edged de￿nition of the process
of international ￿nancial integration and of how to appropriately model this process.
Instead I stress some key points and discuss how ￿nancial integration has been modeled
in the literature.
In general, it is important to distinguish between causes and e⁄ects of ￿nancial
integration. A reduction of the costs of conducting international ￿nancial transactions
is a cause of ￿nancial globalization, whereas an observed increase in cross border equity
holdings is an e⁄ect. Therefore, when modeling ￿nancial integration, a natural question
becomes whether to focus on the causes or on the e⁄ects. Of course, theoretically the
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bulk of the theoretical literature has, however, adopted the other strategy; that is to
model the e⁄ect directly without explanation the cause.
10 A possible reason is that it
remains unclear what the main causes of ￿nancial integration are.
Since the purpose of this paper is to shed light on aspects of standard models, I
follow the bulk of the theoretical literature and model outcomes directly. Hence, I
assume without explanation that households have access to one of two international
￿nancial market structures when trading with households abroad. In the benchmark
model, households can trade in a single bond (before ￿nancial integration) or have access
to complete ￿nancial markets (after integration). I also compare ￿nancial autarky with
the single bond economy.
Since the model is standard in the literature, I relegate a detailed description to the
appendix. Di⁄erent parameterized versions of the model are used to generate arti￿cial
data that is an important input into the Monte Carlo procedure.
3.1. The Monte Carlo Procedure. In essence, the Monte Carlo procedure consists of
two loops, where the ￿rst loop simulates arti￿cial data and the second runs regressions
and calculates test statistics. For the main part of the paper, I set the sample size
and number of observations in the regressions to match Kose, Prasad and Terrones
(2003a,b). As discussed in section 2, they use annual data over 40 years (1960-1999)
from 76 countries. They split the sample into four non-overlapping periods of 10 years,
which leaves around 250 observations of each business cycle measure.
11 As explained
in section 2, these observations are regressed on a number of explanatory variables
including indicators of ￿nancial integration.
The numerical algorithm also involves regressing 250 observations of a particular
volatility or comovement measure on an indicator of ￿nancial integration. I use stan-
dard deviations and cross country correlations of GDP, consumption and investment as
business cycle measures. Moreover, I consider two ratio measures, namely the standard
deviation of investment and consumption relative to the standard deviation of GDP.
These correspond to the bulk of the measures used in the empirical literature. In my
framework, the indicator for ￿nancial integration is a dummy that takes the value of
one if the measure is from the model with more integrated ￿nancial markets. The only
remaining control variable is a constant.
12 More precisely, I run the following simple
version of (2.1)
(3.1) Mi = ￿1 + ￿2FIi + "i
where FI is the dummy.
10Sutherland (1996) and Heathcote and Perri (2004) are exceptions.
11The precise number of observations varies slightly across the di⁄erent speci￿cations considered by
Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003a,b). I retain 250 observations throughout section 4.
12The only di⁄erence between the theoretical models is the structure of ￿nancial markets. Hence,
including additional regressors￿ e.g. the terms of trade, indices of monetary policy shocks etc.￿ is
super￿ uous. Moreover, it uses degrees of freedom and would therefore bias the results against ￿nding
signi￿cant estimates.8 JENS IVERSEN
Testing whether ￿nancial integration a⁄ects the business cycle is a test of whether
￿2 = 0: In this simple framework, ￿1 and ￿1 + ￿2 have some straightforward interpre-
tations. ￿1 is the average value of the measure, M; in the ￿nancially less integrated
model across the 250 observations in the regression. Similarly, ￿1 + ￿2 is the average
value in the more integrated ￿nancial market version of the model.
I now describe the numerical algorithm in detail. The algorithm involves ￿ve steps:
(1) Choose a particular parameter for the theoretical model. Set i = 1 and j = 1:
(2) Simulate a time series of k periods from either the more or less ￿nancially
integrated version of the model, ￿ ipping a fair coin to determine the ￿nancial
structure.
(3) HP-￿lter the time series and calculate standard deviations and cross country
correlations of consumption, GDP and investment. Set i = i+1: If i = n; go to
4, otherwise return to 2.
(4) For each measure, estimate model (3.1) and calculate the robust t-statistic of
a test of whether ￿1 = 0: Compare the statistic with the two-sided 5% critical
values from the t distribution using n￿2 as degrees of freedom. Record whether
the test rejects the null. Also, when the null is rejected, record whether ￿2 < 0 or
￿2 > 0.
(5) Set j = j +1: If j = m; stop the algorithm, otherwise set i = 1 and return to 2.
The procedure requires a number of comments. The papers by Kose, Prasad and
Terrones (2003a,b) use annual data. My theoretical model is calibrated to quar-
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=4: Here a hat denotes log deviation from steady state and
superscript a or q indicates annual or quarterly observations.13 After aggregation I have
10 years of annual observations (k = 10) which are HP ￿ltered using ￿ = 100 as smooth-
ing parameter.14 As mentioned I use 250 observations in each regression, so n = 250:
Finally, I calculate robust t-statistics because there is evidence of heteroskedasticity.
The outcome of the Monte Carlo procedure is the fraction of the m regressions in
which the e⁄ect of ￿nancial integration has the expected sign and is signi￿cant. I denote
this fraction the probability of signi￿cance. In essence, this probability measures the
statistical power of the t-test. If a given model gives rise to a probability of signi￿cance
close to zero, the prediction from the model is that the e⁄ect of ￿nancial integration is
likely to be insigni￿cant.
Whereas the choices of k and n are set as in Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003a,b),
the choice of m is free. In theory, by letting m ! 1 I will obtain the true power of the
t-test. In practice, experiments indicated that m = 2000 was su¢ cient for convergence.
13I aggregate quarterly data into annual observations because I want to consider a new Keynesian
model in the sensitivity analysis. With annual observations it is di¢ cult to calibrate Calvo price
and wage stickiness parameters. Using an IRBC model calibrated to annual data did not change the
conclusions.
14Using a ￿rst di⁄erence ￿lter does not change the results.FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND BUSINESS CYCLES 9
4. Results
This section contains the main results of the paper. I start by considering a bench-
mark international real business cycle model. This model is at the core of most interna-
tional business cycle analyses and is, therefore, a natural starting point for my analysis.
Using this model, the results from the Monte Carlo procedure show that ￿nancial in-
tegration is likely to have insigni￿cant e⁄ects on the business cycle. In fact, the only
business cycle statistic for which the probability of signi￿cance is more than half is the
correlation of consumption. After presenting these results, I provide some intuition and
conduct an extensive sensitivity analysis.
4.1. The Benchmark Model. I consider a calibration of the IRBC model close to
the one used by Heathcote and Perri (2002). The risk-aversion coe¢ cient is set to
two (￿ = 2) and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is set to one half, so ￿ = 2.
Moreover, I set the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods
￿ = 1:5 and the weight on di⁄erent intermediate goods in ￿nal goods production,
￿ = 0:85. Heathcote and Perri (2002) use ￿ = 0:9 and ￿ = 0:85 in their analysis.
Productivity shocks follow a V AR(1) process with ￿ = 0:964 as the autocorrelation
coe¢ cient and $ = 0:035 as the spill-over coe¢ cient. The standard deviation and cross
country correlation of the innovations are 0:0065 and 0:1731 respectively.15 Financial
integration corresponds to a move from a single bond economy to complete ￿nancial
markets.
Table 1 reports the results from the Monte Carlo procedure when the data is generated
by the benchmark model.
Table 1: Monte Carlo Results, Benchmark Model
Single Bond Complete Markets Difference
Beta1 Beta1 + Beta2 Beta2 Beta2 < 0 Beta2 = 0 Beta2 > 0
corr(cons) 0.7275 0.8491 0.1216 0.0000 0.0015 0.9985
0.0217 0.0144 0.0258
std(cons) 0.0165 0.0160 -0.0005 0.0880 0.9085 0.0035
0.0005 0.0005 0.0007
std(cons)/std(GDP) 0.6509 0.6342 -0.0167 0.1570 0.8430 0.0000
0.0120 0.0137 0.0183
corr(invest) -0.5098 -0.5152 -0.0054 0.0320 0.9505 0.0175
0.0302 0.0303 0.0418
std(invest) 0.0686 0.0690 0.0004 0.0180 0.9480 0.0340
0.0019 0.0019 0.0028
std(invest)/std(GDP) 2.7217 2.7286 0.0069 0.0210 0.9550 0.0240
0.0479 0.0480 0.0669
corr(GDP) 0.1327 0.1243 -0.0083 0.0330 0.9535 0.0135
0.0383 0.0392 0.0537
std(GDP) 0.0258 0.0259 0.0001 0.0175 0.9560 0.0265
0.0007 0.0008 0.0011
Fraction of times t-test indicates
Standard deviation of the coefficients in italics. Columns 5-7: power of t-test on Beta2.
Note: Monte Carlo results using 2000 regressions. Columns 2-4: Average coefficients across 2000 regressions.
15I estimate the parameters of the V AR(1) process using US and European data￿ see the data
appendix for details.10 JENS IVERSEN
Each row of the table corresponds to regressions on a particular business cycle measure
as indicated by the ￿rst column. Columns two, three and four report the averages of
￿1, ￿1 +￿2 and ￿2 respectively and the corresponding sample standard deviations over
2000 regressions. The right-hand side of the table reports the fraction of times the t-test
indicates that ￿2 is signi￿cantly negative, not signi￿cant and signi￿cantly positive at
the 5% level. The bold face entries are the probabilities of signi￿cance; that is, the
fraction of regressions the t-test rejects the null hypothesis (￿2 = 0) in favor of the true
alternative.
The Di⁄erence column shows that ￿nancial integration increases the correlation and
decreases the standard deviation of consumption. Trading in complete ￿nancial markets
allows for further sharing of consumption risks, which makes consumption pro￿les less
volatile and more synchronized across borders. Investment becomes less synchronized
and more volatile following ￿nancial integration essentially because investment ￿ ows
more easily. Under the benchmark parameterization, GDP becomes more volatile and
less synchronized across countries.
The table also shows that the e⁄ect of integration is imprecisely estimated for many
business cycle statistics. For instance, the average e⁄ect of integration on the standard
deviation of consumption is -0.05%, but the standard deviation is 0.07%. Hence, an es-
timated increase in the standard deviation is completely plausible and actually occurs in
around 22% of the regressions. The imprecision of the estimates gives rise to low power
in the associated t-test. The table shows that the e⁄ect of integration on the standard
deviation of consumption is signi￿cantly negative in less than 9% of the regressions. For
the relative volatility of consumption to GDP the probability of signi￿cance is slightly
larger. For this statistic, the e⁄ect of integration is signi￿cantly negative in around 16%
of the regressions. The probability of insigni￿cance is less when considering the GDP
and investment statistics. For these measures, the likelihood of attaining a signi￿cant
e⁄ect with the correct sign is smaller than 5%. The only measure where the probability
of signi￿cance is larger than 50% is the correlation of consumption. Using this business
cycle statistic, the e⁄ect of integration is signi￿cant in practically all regressions.
I now provide some intuition for the results. The top row of Figure 1 shows distri-
butions of ￿1 and ￿1 + ￿2 for the correlation of consumption and standard deviation
of GDP. A key point to notice from the ￿gure is that the estimated ￿￿ s vary substan-
tially. This variation is a re￿ ection of the fact that di⁄erent economies are subject
to di⁄erent shocks. As the ￿gure shows, this implies that even if the ￿nancial market
structure is the same, the business cycle statistics can be very di⁄erent. If this variation
is large compared with the average e⁄ect of integration, the estimated e⁄ect is likely
to be insigni￿cant and can even be signi￿cant, but have the "wrong" sign. Notice that
the variation of the ￿￿ s is driven by the stochastic nature of the model and the short
sample size. In other words, imprecision will characterize the estimates no matter what
stochastic business cycle model I use as data generating process.FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND BUSINESS CYCLES 11
Figure 1 shows that for the correlation of consumption the average e⁄ect of ￿nancial
integration is large compared with the standard deviation of the e⁄ect.16 This implies
that most of the associated t-statistics are larger than the critical value of around
t = 1:97: To the contrary, the e⁄ect of ￿nancial integration on the standard deviation
of GDP is quite small. For this measure the distributions of ￿1 and ￿1+￿2 are virtually
on top of each other. This implies that the t-statistics are within the boundaries of the
critical values meaning a large probability of insigni￿cance. Moreover, the probability
of obtaining signi￿cant estimates with the wrong sign is not much smaller than the
probability of obtaining signi￿cant estimates with the "correct" sign￿ see Table 1.
The variation in estimates is an inverse function of the size of the sample underlying
the estimation. With larger sample sizes, either in terms of the number of observations
in each regression or the number of periods underlying the calculation of each business
cycle statistic, the variation falls and the probability of signi￿cance increases. In Section
5, I examine how sensitive the power statistics are to variation in the underlying sample
size.
Figure 1: Distributions of ￿ coe¢ cients and t-statistics
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Distribution of t-statistics: Standard Deviation GDP
16The distribution of t-statistics emerges by drawing repeatedly from the single bond and complete
markets model, subtracting the draws and dividing the di⁄erence with the associated standard error.
This standard error can be approximated by the square root of the sum of the variances of the ￿1 and
￿1 + ￿2 distributions.12 JENS IVERSEN
4.2. Sensitivity Analysis. The main purpose of this subsection is to show that the
results from the benchmark model hold across a range of models. I do this in two steps.
First, I retain the benchmark model structure and examine how the results vary with
some key parameters. Second, I change the model structure by allowing alternative
modeling assumptions regarding ￿nancial integration and nominal rigidity.
A number of results emerge from this analysis. First, under the benchmark modeling
of ￿nancial integration, the business cycle statistics based on consumption often have
a larger probability of signi￿cance compared to the statistics based on investment and
GDP. Second, introducing nominal rigidity and shocks does not overturn this conclusion.
Third, modeling ￿nancial integration in a di⁄erent manner has a major impact on the
results. If ￿nancial integration corresponds to a change from ￿nancial autarky to a single
bond economy, consumption based statistics have a lower probability of signi￿cance
compared to investment and GDP statistics. Fourth, model structures exist where the
probability of signi￿cance for any business cycle statistic is close to zero. Hence, on
the basis of a range of models the results suggest that ￿nancial integration should have
insigni￿cant e⁄ects on the business cycle.
4.2.1. Varying the Benchmark Model Parameters. Table 2 shows the probabilities of
signi￿cance under four alternative calibrations of the IRBC model. To ease comparison,
the ￿rst column shows the probabilities from the benchmark calibration.
Table 2: Probabilities of Signi￿cance, Variations of Benchmark Model Parameters
Benchmark Model Infinite Frisch Elasticity Log Utility of Consumption Persistent Productivity Larger Substitutability
Phi = 0 Sigma = 1 Rho_A = 0.999 Theta = 5
corr(cons) 0.9985 0.7830 0.4990 1.0000 1.0000
std(cons) 0.0880 0.1015 0.0625 0.9850 0.2900
std(cons)/std(GDP) 0.1570 0.6230 0.2115 1.0000 0.5675
corr(invest) 0.0320 0.0925 0.0390 0.5690 0.1730
std(invest) 0.0340 0.1420 0.0355 0.5165 0.2695
std(invest)/std(GDP) 0.0240 0.0475 0.0610 0.8610 0.0370
corr(GDP) 0.0330 0.1990 0.0210 0.1605 0.3545
std(GDP) 0.0265 0.1490 0.0240 0.0665 0.2200
Note: Monte Carlo results using 2000 regressions.
In the ￿rst experiment, I change the responsiveness of labor supply to wage changes.
Studies based on microdata show that the labor supply elasticity is near zero, implying
large values of ￿. However, Hansen (1985) provides an example where the labor supply
elasticity of the representative agent is di⁄erent from that of individual agents. In his
example, the labor supply elasticity is zero at the micro level, but in￿nite for the repre-
sentative agent. Column two shows the results from the Monte Carlo procedure when ￿
is at 0 and all other parameters are retained at their benchmark value. The table shows
that the probabilities of signi￿cance change only slightly compared to the benchmark
case. Quantitatively the largest e⁄ects are for the correlation and relative volatility
of consumption. The probability of signi￿cance decreases for the former measure but
increases for the latter. For the correlation of consumption, the lower probability of
signi￿cance is primarily caused by less precise estimates. Hence, with a more ￿ exibleFINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND BUSINESS CYCLES 13
labor supply the correlation of consumption varies more across simulations. In con-
trast, the larger probability of obtaining signi￿cant estimates of the relative volatility
of consumption is caused by a larger average e⁄ect of integration. The probability of
signi￿cance increases slightly for the remaining business cycle measures, but the change
is quantitatively small.
The next experiment I consider is varying ￿; the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
In the real business cycle literature, ￿ has often been set at unity, corresponding to log
utility of consumption, since this value is consistent with balanced growth. However, in
the international business cycle literature, values of ￿ > 2 are not uncommon.17 Table 2
shows the results from the Monte Carlo procedure if ￿ = 1.18 As with the labor supply
elasticity, changing risk aversion has little e⁄ect on the power statistics. In fact, the only
measure where the probability of signi￿cance changes substantially is the correlation
of consumption. This probability is lower with less risk averse households. The reason
is both a lower average e⁄ect of integration and less precision in the estimates of this
e⁄ect. In summary, the probability of obtaining signi￿cant estimates does not depend
strongly on the benchmark values of ￿ and ￿:
Column four reports the results from the Monte Carlo procedure when productivity
shocks are near unit root processes, ￿A = 0:999.19 With unit root productivity shocks,
business cycle statistics based on consumption are very likely to be signi￿cant. In fact,
the probability of signi￿cance is larger than 98% for the three consumption based busi-
ness cycle statistics. Also the statistics based on investment and GDP are more likely
to be signi￿cant with more persistant productivity shocks, albeit the change is not as
large as for the consumption based statistics. For instance, the statistics based on GDP
are still insigni￿cant in more than 80% of the regressions. The larger probabilities of
signi￿cance are a re￿ ection of the fact that ￿nancial integration (under the benchmark
modeling assumption) has quantitatively larger e⁄ects when productivity is a near unit
root process. As Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Iversen (2009) explain, when income
shocks are permanent there is no ex post consumption smoothing incentive. This im-
plies that when households have access to a single bond only, there is no transfer of
purchasing power to the relatively low income country so consumption behavior is very
di⁄erent across countries. This contrasts with the complete markets framework, where
there is ex ante insurance. Under this market framework, households have agreed to
share purchasing power, implying that consumption responds similarly across countries
regardless of the persistency of the shocks. Hence, when shocks are close to perma-
nent, the additional risk sharing opportunities o⁄ered by the ￿nancial market imply
substantial changes in consumption behavior and therefore in ￿2 estimates.
17Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) show that ￿ = 5 is needed to capture the empirically observed
volatility of the real exchange rate in standard models.
18I also experimented with ￿ = 5. Except for slightly larger probabilities of attaining signi￿cant
GDP volatility and comovement measures, the results are essentially unchanged.
19I follow Heathcote and Perri (2002) and adjust $A so the largest eigenvalue of the coe¢ cient
matrix in the VAR remains constant.14 JENS IVERSEN
Now consider how the results change with the intratemporal elasticity of substitution,
￿. Cole and Obstfeld (1991) pointed out that the value of ￿ is important in determining
the e⁄ects of changing the ￿nancial market structure. Micro studies usually ￿nd values
of ￿ ranging from 4 to 15, whereas estimates based on macro time series data usually
obtain values from 1 to 3 (Coeurdacier, 2009). Column ￿ve shows the results from
setting ￿ = 5:
In general, the column shows that the probability of obtaining signi￿cant e⁄ects
of integration is larger when ￿ = 5 compared to the benchmark calibration. Notice,
however, that the probability of obtaining signi￿cant estimates is still quite low. In fact,
all but two business cycle statistics are signi￿cantly a⁄ected by ￿nancial integration
in less than 40% of the regressions. To get intuition for the increase, notice that
productivity shocks have both a direct and an indirect e⁄ect on relative income. The
direct e⁄ect is related to the fact that with larger productivity, more output can be
produced with the same level of inputs. For any given terms of trade, this e⁄ect
increases relative income. However, in general equilibrium the relatively productive
country will experience a terms of trade depreciation because it produces more output.
This e⁄ect tends to reduce relative income. While the direct e⁄ect is independent of ￿;
the indirect e⁄ect becomes smaller the larger ￿ is. In the limit, as ￿ ! 1, outputs in
di⁄erent countries become perfect substitutes and the terms of trade are always unity.
Hence, for larger values of ￿ relative income responds more to shocks, increasing the
e⁄ect of changing the ￿nancial market structure. Hence, the result from the ￿gure is as
we should expect: the probability of obtaining signi￿cant estimates increases with ￿:
I also tried a number of di⁄erent calibrations of ￿. Increasing the elasticity of sub-
stitution from ￿ = 5 in general increases the probabilities of signi￿cance, but even with
￿ = 15 many important business cycle statistics are signi￿cant in less than 50% of the
regressions. For instance, the probabilities of signi￿cance for the standard deviation
of consumption and GDP are around 33% and 45% when ￿ = 15: I also considered a
calibration where ￿ = 0:9 as used by Heathcote and Perri (2002). Under this calibra-
tion the probability of obtaining signi￿cant estimates is close to zero for all business
cycle statistics (not shown). An example is that the probability of signi￿cance for the
correlation of consumption is signi￿cantly a⁄ected by integration is less than 10% in
this case. The intuition follows directly from above. When the elasticity of substitution
is close to unity, the movements in the terms of trade adjust so that relative income
does not change much following a shock. Hence, the e⁄ect of ￿nancial integration is
low implying a large probability of insigni￿cance.
I also experimented with other calibrations of the stochastic process driving produc-
tivity. Baxter and Crucini (1995) argue that it is di¢ cult to determine the precise






in the productivity shock
process. Correspondingly, I also tried a calibration with ￿ = 0:908 and $ = 0:088 as
used in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992). With this calibration all business cycle
statistics except the correlation of consumption have probabilities of signi￿cance of less
than 10%.FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND BUSINESS CYCLES 15
4.2.2. Modeling Financial Integration Di⁄erently. In the benchmark model, integration
corresponds to changing the ￿nancial market structure from a single bond economy to
complete markets. However, as Heathcote and Perri (2002) show, a model with ￿nancial
autarky is better at capturing key aspects of the data, implying that the "before"
￿nancial integration situation is, perhaps, better captured by the autarky situation. It
could also be argued that complete markets is not the proper way to model the "after"
integration situation.
Correspondingly, I assume that ￿nancial integration amounts to a move from ￿nancial
autarky to the single bond economy. Table 3 shows the results from the Monte Carlo
procedure in this case using the benchmark calibration of the parameters.
Table 3: Monte Carlo Results, Financial Autarky vs. Single Bond
Financial Autarky Single Bond Difference
Beta1 Beta1 + Beta2 Beta2 Beta2 < 0 Beta2 = 0 Beta2 > 0
corr(cons) 0.7662 0.7609 -0.0053 0.0390 0.9490 0.0120
0.0203 0.0212 0.0291
std(cons) 0.0160 0.0160 0.0000 0.0165 0.9595 0.0240
0.0005 0.0005 0.0007
std(cons)/std(GDP) 0.6320 0.6048 -0.0272 0.3270 0.6730 0.0000
0.0128 0.0128 0.0182
corr(invest) -0.3985 -0.6349 -0.2364 1 0 0
0.0336 0.0253 0.0412
std(invest) 0.0658 0.0864 0.0206 0 0 1
0.0019 0.0024 0.0031
std(invest)/std(GDP) 2.5987 3.2877 0.6890 0 0 1
0.0399 0.0638 0.0742
corr(GDP) 0.1639 0.0634 -0.1005 0.4495 0.5505 0.0000
0.0380 0.0395 0.0538
std(GDP) 0.0258 0.0270 0.0013 0.0015 0.7885 0.2100
0.0007 0.0008 0.0011
Standard deviation of the coefficients in italics. Columns 5-7: power of t-test on Beta2.
Note: Monte Carlo results using 2000 regressions. Columns 2-4: Average coefficients across 2000 regressions.
Fraction of times t-test indicates
In contrast to the benchmark model, business cycle statistics based on GDP are now
more likely to be signi￿cant than consumption based statistics. For instance, the prob-
ability that the correlation of consumption is signi￿cant is now about 4%. This should
be seen in relation to a probability of signi￿cance of more than 99% in the benchmark
model. Hence, the precise way ￿nancial integration is modeled is crucial for the conclu-
sions. Notice from the table that the investment measures are always signi￿cant under
the present modeling of integration. Under ￿nancial autarky, investment equals savings
so by removing this link, ￿nancial integration a⁄ects investment behavior substantially.
Also the GDP based statistics are more likely to be signi￿cant with the current model-
ing of ￿nancial integration. The cross correlation of GDP is signi￿cant in a bit less than
half of the regressions, whereas the standard deviation is signi￿cant in around a ￿fth of
the cases. Notice also that the qualitative e⁄ects of integration on the correlation and16 JENS IVERSEN
standard deviation of consumption are di⁄erent compared to the benchmark model:
consumption becomes less synchronized and more volatile with ￿nancial integration.20
These results highlight the fact that it is not given that ￿nancial integration always
a⁄ects consumption behavior in a signi￿cant manner but depends on the precise nature
of ￿nancial integration. In the present model, ￿nancial integration does not provide any
ex ante consumption insurance, implying that the behavior of consumption does not
change much with integration. In contrast, decoupling saving from investment matters
a lot so investment behavior is radically di⁄erent following integration. The changed
investment behavior drives a change in the behavior of GDP that is more likely to be
a⁄ected by integration than in the benchmark case.
4.2.3. The New Keynesian Model. The ￿nal experiment I consider is to introduce im-
perfect competition, nominal rigidities and nominal shocks into the model. Sutherland
(1996) shows that the business cycle e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration might vary across
the sources of shocks hitting the economy. Also, Iversen (2009) shows that the e⁄ects
of ￿nancial integration are large in an economy bu⁄eted by nominal shocks only.
I introduce imperfect competition in two ways. First, I assume that labor markets
are characterized by imperfect competition modeled using household/unions Æ la Erceg,
Henderson and Levin (2000). Second, I follow Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002)
and assume that intermediate goods are sold under monopolistic competition. Both
nominal wages and intermediate goods prices are staggered modeled as in Calvo (1983).
I introduce money shocks by assuming that nominal money supply growth follows a
V AR(1) process. Money demand arises because real money enters the utility function.
I introduce both nominal prices and wages because the results of Iversen (2009) indicate
that the interaction of wage rigidity and nominal shocks is important in generating
large quantitative e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration. As in the benchmark model, ￿nancial
integration corresponds to a change from a single bond economy to complete ￿nancial
markets.
I set the probability that prices and wages are revised to 25% per quarter. The
elasticities of substitution in the wage and intermediate goods sector such that the
steady state mark-up is 10%. I estimate the parameters of the money growth process
using data from the US and Germany but the results are robust to variations of these
parameters.
Table 4 reports the results from the Monte Carlo procedure when the data is generated
by the new Keynesian model.
20Notice, however, that the volatility increase is very small.FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND BUSINESS CYCLES 17
Table 4: Monte Carlo Results, New Keynesian Model
Single Bond Complete Markets Difference
Beta1 Beta1 + Beta2 Beta2 Beta2 < 0 Beta2 = 0 Beta2 > 0
corr(cons) 0.4081 0.5957 0.1876 0.0000 0.0250 0.9750
0.0380 0.0295 0.0480
std(cons) 0.0137 0.0129 -0.0008 0.2555 0.7440 0.0005
0.0004 0.0004 0.0006
std(cons)/std(GDP) 0.6707 0.6337 -0.0370 0.5580 0.4420 0.0000
0.0113 0.0133 0.0173
corr(invest) 0.2960 0.3017 0.0057 0.0175 0.9500 0.0325
0.0351 0.0337 0.0481
std(invest) 0.0491 0.0489 -0.0002 0.0320 0.9495 0.0185
0.0013 0.0013 0.0019
std(invest)/std(GDP) 2.4633 2.4519 -0.0114 0.0435 0.9445 0.0120
0.0434 0.0461 0.0650
corr(GDP) 0.1490 0.1413 -0.0077 0.0360 0.9500 0.0140
0.0415 0.0399 0.0567
std(GDP) 0.0207 0.0207 0.0000 0.0175 0.9560 0.0265
0.0006 0.0006 0.0009
Standard deviation of the coefficients in italics. Columns 5-7: power of t-test on Beta2.
Note: Monte Carlo results using 2000 regressions. Columns 2-4: Average coefficients across 2000 regressions.
Fraction of times t-test indicates
The model produces larger probabilities of signi￿cance compared to the benchmark
model, for two of the three consumption based statistics. For instance, the standard
deviation of consumption is now signi￿cantly a⁄ected by integration in around a fourth
of the regressions. In the benchmark model, this number was 9%. Also the probability
that the relative consumption volatility is signi￿cant increases, and is, in the new Key-
nesian model, more than 55%. The probability that the correlation of consumption is
signi￿cantly a⁄ected is slightly less than in the benchmark model. The larger probabil-
ity of obtaining signi￿cant estimates is caused by a larger average e⁄ect of integration.
Under rigid nominal wages, the response of relative income is more persistent following
nominal shocks, implying that the e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration are larger (Iversen,
2009).
For the remaining business cycle statistics, the probabilities of signi￿cance are low,
as in the benchmark model. It is worth noting that the qualitative e⁄ects of ￿nancial
integration on investment are di⁄erent from the benchmark model. This is, however,
not a robust feature of the new Keynesian model and I do not go into further detail on
this point here.
This section shows that it is relatively easy to set up models where the e⁄ect of
￿nancial integration is likely to be insigni￿cant with the current sample sizes. This
means that the expectation these models allows us to have before seeing the empirical
results is not that ￿nancial integration has signi￿cant e⁄ects on business cycles. Instead,
based on an overview of the results from these models, we should not be surprised to
obtain insigni￿cant e⁄ects in the data.18 JENS IVERSEN
5. Varying the Sample Size
In the previous section, I analyzed how the probability of signi￿cance varied with
the model structure while retaining the sample size constant. In this section I conduct
the alternative exercise and examine how the likelihood of signi￿cance varies with the
sample size but maintain the benchmark model as the data generating process. The
purpose is twofold. First, I want to highlight that the reason why many estimates
are insigni￿cant is due to short samples. With su¢ ciently long samples the e⁄ects
of integration are always signi￿cant. The important question is, therefore, how long
"su¢ ciently long" is. Shedding light on this question is the second purpose of the
section.
I study how the probabilities of signi￿cance changes with sample sizes along two
dimensions. First, I change the sample sizes underlying the calculation of each business
cycle measure and, second, I vary the number of observations in the regressions. To
understand why an overall increase in available data can increase either of these two
terms, recall the approach used in the empirical literature. Here the researcher obtains
a panel dataset of macroeconomic variables of, say, 40 annual observations spanning a
range of countries. The annual observations are then split into a number of periods and
the measure of comovement or volatility is calculated on data from these periods. Each
of these measures is regarded as a separate observation of the dependent variable.21 It
follows that the larger the number of periods, the larger the number of observations
of the dependent variable, but also the lower number of periods are underlying the
calculation of each dependent variable. For instance, in the benchmark model k = 10
and n = 250, meaning there are 10 annual observations underlying the calculation
of, say, the standard deviation of consumption. Instead, with the same dataset, it is
possible to choose k = 5 implying n = 500: In this section, I analyze the consequences of
increasing ￿rst the number of observations of the dependent variable, n; and second the
number of annual observations underlying the calculating of each dependent variable,
k.
21Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003a,b) use four periods implying 10 annual observations of the
macroeconomic variable in each period.FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND BUSINESS CYCLES 19
Figure 2 plots power as a function of n in the benchmark model.22
Figure 2: Power Statistics, Varying number of observations, n
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First, notice that power increases with the number of observations in the regressions.
For instance, for the standard deviation of consumption, the probability of insigni￿cance
decreases from more than 90% to around 60% across the values of n. A similar result
holds for the relative standard deviation of consumption. This illustrates that insignif-
icant estimates are a short-run problem. With su¢ ciently large samples, the e⁄ects
will always be signi￿cant. A second thing to notice is that the increase in the proba-
bility of signi￿cance varies considerably across business cycle measures. For instance,
the increase for the standard deviation and correlation of GDP is hardly noticeable.
Hence, even with n = 2500￿ which corresponds to ten times as much data as is used in
Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003a,b)￿ it is still very likely that ￿nancial integration
has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on GDP measures. The reason is that even with n = 2500;
the imprecision in the estimation is still large compared with the average e⁄ect. For
instance, for the standard deviation of GDP, the average e⁄ect of ￿nancial integration
is only a third of the estimated standard deviation of this e⁄ect.
22I focus on the standard deviation measures of consumption and the standard deviation and cor-
relation of GDP. The probability of obtaining a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the correlation of consumption is
close to unity for all values of n:20 JENS IVERSEN
Figure 3 explores whether increasing k; the number of annual periods underlying the
calculating of the business cycle measures, changes this conclusion.
Figure 3: Power Statistics, Varying number of periods, k
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In general, the results are similar to those from Figure 2: the e⁄ect of increasing k
is largest for the consumption measures and hardly detectable for the GDP measures.
With k > 90, the probability that the volatility of consumption relative to GDP is
signi￿cantly a⁄ected by integration is close to 100%. k = 90 corresponds to nine times
as much data as used by Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003a,b), which is more than 350
years of data.
The conclusion from this section is that even though the problems of obtaining sig-
ni￿cant e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration is a short run problem, the short run might be
quite long. At least for the GDP measures, the results from this section indicate that
having access to ten times as much data, would not do much di⁄erence: the e⁄ects of
￿nancial integration would still very likely come out insigni￿cant.
6. Conclusion
Standard theoretical business cycle models predict that ￿nancial globalization will
a⁄ect the cycle. The question asked in this paper is whether we should expect the
e⁄ect to be signi￿cant. In the extent to which the expectation is based on a range
of standard international macroeconomic models, the answer is no: the probability of
signi￿cance is low across many plausible model parameterizations and business cycle
statistics. An implication is that we should not be surprised when ￿nancial integrationFINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND BUSINESS CYCLES 21
has mere insigni￿cant e⁄ects on business cycles in the data: many standard models
have exactly this prediction.
Even though the results are based on tightly parameterized models, I argue that they
are more general and are likely to extend to many other model frameworks. The reason
is twofold. First, it is a well known result that changing the international ￿nancial
market structure has a limited quantitative e⁄ect on business cycle statistics in standard
international macroeconomic models. This means that the average e⁄ect of integration
is small according to these models. Second, estimating business cycle statistics from a
small sample induces substantial imprecision in the estimate when the data is generated
by a stochastic model. The combination of these two e⁄ects is likely to induce large
probabilities of insigni￿cance across many theoretical frameworks.
My results give rise to a number of remarks and suggestions for future research. First,
the results are based on, I would argue, standard international macroeconomic models.
Using these models is a natural starting point, since the models are often envoked when
motivating why ￿nancial globalization should a⁄ect the business cycle. However, the
above discussion suggests that the limited quantitative e⁄ect of ￿nancial integration
in these models is an important factor behind the many insigni￿cant e⁄ects. Future
research should determine whether these models are appropriate frameworks in which
to understand aspects of international ￿nancial integration. Second, my insigni￿cant
results are a product of small sample sizes. Empirical studies are likely to su⁄er from
additional econometric problems such as, for instance, endogenous regressors, measure-
ment error and non-linear e⁄ects. If these problems are not properly accounted for in
the empirical analysis the estimated e⁄ect of integration is numerically small and more
likely to be insigni￿cant. Hence, even if ￿nancial integration changes the business cycle
substantially, it might be di¢ cult to pick up these e⁄ects in the data. More empirical
work is needed to account for these problems, thereby allowing a better understanding
of how ￿nancial globalization a⁄ects business cycles.
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Appendix
The Model Economy. I set up a general model that nests both the IRBC and new
Keynesian models used in the main text under appropriate settings of the parameters.
The world consists of two countries Home and Foreign, both of size unity. ThereFINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND BUSINESS CYCLES 23
are three sectors in each country; a household/union, an intermediate goods and a
￿nal goods sector. Intermediate goods and labor supplies are sold under monopolistic
competition with prices and wages subject to staggering as in Calvo (1983). Final
goods are country speci￿c and produced by combining intermediate goods from both
countries. Final goods are used for consumption and investment purposes. Each country
is a⁄ected by both productivity and money supply shocks.




















st:Ptct (i) + Ptxt (i) + EtQt;t+1B
C
t+1 (i) + Mt (i)
= B
C
t (i) + Mt￿1 (i) + Ptrtkt￿1 (i) + Wt (i)ht (i) + Tt (i) + ￿t (i)








Pt ;ht (i);xt (i) and kt￿1 (i) are consumption, real money, labor supply,
investment and the capital stock of household i in period t: Pt is the price of the
consumption/investment good, rt is the real gross return to capital, Wt (i) is the nominal
wage rate, Tt (i) is a lump-sum transfer from the government and ￿t (i) is the pro￿t
from the intermediate goods producers. Household i has access to state contingent
claims, BC
t+1 (i); implying that it can buy an asset for each state of the economy in
the next period. These assets have the property that they yield one unit of Home
currency in a particular state and zero otherwise. The total cost of buying these assets
is EtQt;t+1BC






I assume that ￿(￿) = ￿0 (￿) = 0 and ￿00 (￿) = d where d is the investment adjustment
cost. These restrictions ensure that the steady state is independent of the cost of
adjusting investment.23
Since I assume complete within country risk sharing, only labor supplies and real wage
rates will di⁄er across households. Correspondingly, I drop index i in the following. The
23Because I solve the model by log-linearization, I do not have to specify a functional form for ￿(￿).24 JENS IVERSEN



























￿￿ rt+1 + ￿t+1
￿













where I have de￿ned 1
EtQt;t+1 = It as the Home nominal interest rate.
In the case of the single bond model, the households maximize utility subject to the
following constraint













t￿1 (i) + Mt￿1 (i) + Ptrtkt￿1 (i) + Wt (i)ht (i) + Tt (i) + ￿t (i)
and the capital accumulation constraint. Following Heathcote and Perri (2002), I intro-
duce a small ￿nancial adjustment cost￿ indexed by ’￿ to induce stationarity. The ￿rst
order conditions associated with this problem are the same as those under complete
markets except for the consumption Euler equation which is given as (again leaving out













The ￿nancial autarky model is the same as the single bond model except that BI
t =
￿ B = 0 8t. In this case, the consumption Euler equation drops out as an equilibrium
equation.

















st: Pt+kct+k + Pt+kxt+k + Et+kQt+k;t+k+1At+k+1 + Mt+k =







Because of complete domestic ￿nancial markets, only the wage and labor supply is
household speci￿c. Correspondingly, I do not index the remaining variables. The
solution is similar under the alternative international ￿nancial market structures, as longFINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND BUSINESS CYCLES 25
as the domestic ￿nancial market o⁄ers complete within country consumption insurance.



































Final Goods Sector. A continuum of ￿nal goods producers exists in each country. They
acquire intermediate goods from Home and Foreign producers, which they combine
into a country speci￿c ￿nal good. The ￿nal good is used for either consumption or














where yH;t and yF;t are aggregates of intermediate goods from Home and Foreign. These

















The problem of ￿nal goods producers falls in two steps. First, they decide upon































Second, they maximize pro￿ts subject to the production function26 JENS IVERSEN
max
yH;yF



































which is the Home CPI as shown in the main text. An identical problem applies to
￿nal goods producers located in Foreign.

















































where PH;t (i) is the price to the Home market and P ￿
H;t (i) is the price in Foreign
currency.








(1 ￿ !)PH;t (i)





DH;t+k = ￿ (PH;t+k)
!￿￿ (Pt+k)
￿ yt+k
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Because of constant returns to scale, optimal demand for labor and capital are found









wt = mct (1 ￿ ￿)(kt￿1)
￿ (ht)
￿￿
where mct is marginal costs.
Money Supply. I assume that nominal money supply follows a stochastic process￿ see
below. The proceeds from seigniorage are transferred back to households in a lump-sum
fashion. I assume that the budget is balanced on a period by period basis so public
transfers satisfy
Mt ￿ Mt￿1 = Tt
where Tt is aggregate nominal lump-sum transfers.
Market Clearing Conditions and Solution Procedure. The ￿nal goods market clearing
constraint in Home is given as






In the single bond model, ￿nancial adjustment costs are added to the market clearing
condition. Because they are quadratic, these costs do not have ￿rst order e⁄ects and
will therefore cancel under my solution procedure. The same applies for investment
adjustment costs.


























The terms involving the PA indices re￿ ect price dispersion and have no consequence
for ￿rst order dynamics. They are therefore irrelevant under my solution procedure.28 JENS IVERSEN
The closing of the model can vary a bit depending on the structure of ￿nancial








where qt is the real exchange rate. Under single bonds and ￿nancial autarky situations,
the model is closed by imposing the representative Home household￿ s ￿ ow budget con-
straint.
I solve the model by log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions around the non-
stochastic steady state and solve the (now) linear dynamic system of equations using
methods based on Blanchard and Kahn (1980).24 As mentioned, I assume complete
symmetry across countries, which implies that in steady state the current account is
zero.
Calibration. I calibrate the benchmark (IRBC) model as follows
Table A1: Benchmark Calibration
Preferences
Discount factor ￿ = 0:99
Risk Aversion ￿ = 2
Inverse Frisch Elasticity ￿ = 2
Financial adjustment cost ’ = 10￿3
Depreciation ￿ = 0:025
Final Goods Sector
Home Bias ￿ = 0:85
Elasticity of Substitution ￿ = 1:5
Intermediate Goods Sector
Elasticity of Substitution ! = 10000
Nominal Rigidity ￿ = 0
Labor Union Sector
Elasticity of Substitution ￿ = 10000
Nominal Rigidity   = 0
The new Keynesian model uses the same parameter values but sets ! = ￿ = 11 and
￿ =   = 0:75:
Across all experiments, the investment adjustment costs are set such that the volatil-
ity of HP-￿ltered investment relative to GDP in the single bond or ￿nancial autarky
model (depending on the modeling of ￿nancial integration) in the quarterly data equals
2.78.25 Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) calculate this value based on post-war US
data.
24More precisely, I use Dynare to calculate the equilibrium law of motion.
25If investment is not su¢ ciently volatile, I set d = 0:FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND BUSINESS CYCLES 29


























where I allow for correlation of the innovations. To estimate the parameters, I measure
productivity using the production function26
log(At) = log(yt) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)log(ht)
Using the calibrated value of ￿; productivity is derived using data on GDP and labor












= 0:0065. These estimates are close to those obtained by Heathcote and
Perri (2002).28
Following Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) I assume that the growth rate of





























Again I rely on data from the US and Europe to estimate the parameters. However,
given that many European countries were in an exchange rate regime with the US until
1971, and after that in more or less explicit regimes with Germany as the leader, I
consider only the money supplies of the US and Germany. Using M1 as the measure of












= 0:01:29 These estimates are similar to those obtained by Kollmann
(2001).30
26Following, for instance, Heathcote and Perri (2002) I neglect variations in capital input when
calculating total factor productivity.
27I use data from the US and an aggregate of European countries. The countries are Germany,
France, Italy and the United Kingdom in the period 1978q1 to 2002q3. See the data appendix for
further descriptions of the data and empirical procedure.












29Neither the spill-over nor the correlation of innovations are signi￿cant at the 5% level, indicating
that monetary policy was independent. However, in order to be consistent, I retain all parameters at
their estimated value. See the data appendix for further descriptions of the data.











= 0:009:30 JENS IVERSEN
Table A2 collects the parameters of the stochastic processes.
Table A2: Benchmark Calibration, Stochastic Processes
Productivity
Persistence, productivity ￿A = 0:964
Spill-over, productivity $A = 0:035














Persistence, money ￿M = 0:500
Spill-over, money $M = 0:016














Total Factor Productivity. I use GDP and labor supply data for the US, Germany,
France, the United Kingdom and Italy for the period 1978q1 to 2002q3 obtained through
Data-Stream. For GDP data I rely on the International Financial Statistics database
published by the IMF. In particular, I use
￿ USI99BVRG (United States)
￿ BDI99BVRG (Germany)
￿ FRI99BVRG (France)
￿ UKI99BVRG (United Kingdom)
￿ ITI99BVRG (Italy)
The labor input data I use is from OECD￿ s Main Economic Indicators. The mnemon-
ics are
￿ USOEM040G (United States)
￿ BDOEM040G (Germany)
￿ FROEM040G (France)
￿ UKOEM040G (United Kingdom)
￿ ITOEM040G (Italy)
From this data I calculated a series for total factor productivity for each country
using the production function
log(At) = log(yt) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)log(ht)
and the calibrated value of ￿: To get a European total factor productivity measure I
aggregate productivity for each country using a weighted sum of log productivities. As
country weights I use the average relative share of nominal GDP of the country over
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where symmetry was imposed in the estimation step. The ￿rst row corresponds to
the US and where ￿ is the correlation coe¢ cient between innovations. I used the
standard deviation of the error in the US equation as the theoretical standard deviation
of productivity innovations.
Money Supply. I obtain data for US and German money supply (M1, current prices)
for the period 1971q1 to 1998q4. The data is from the international ￿nancial statistics
compiled by the IMF and obtained using DataStream. The mnemonics are
￿ USQ59MACB (United States)
￿ BDQ59MACB (Germany)







giving me two time series for money growth. Based on these series I estimate a V AR(1)
restricting the diagonal and o⁄-diagonal parameters of the coe¢ cient matrix to be equal.












where A is the coe¢ cient matrix, ￿ contains the standard deviations of the errors in each
equation and ￿ is the correlation between the errors. In the model, I use the standard
deviation of the error in the US equations as the theoretical standard deviation of
innovations.